This paper provides new empirical insights on the relation between a firm’s customer concentration and CEO equity incentives.
We argue that greater customer concentration reduces the demand for CEO equity-based pay (i.e., compensation delta) through the joint effects of high risk exposures and simpler managerial task delegation and monitoring. Using a broad sample of U.S. supplier firms with varying degrees of customer concentration, we present robust empirical evidence supporting this prediction.
Our CEO compensation delta results also explain, and likely supplant, recent research attempting to link CEO.
Ana Albuquerque is a professor at Questrom School of Business - Boston University, renowned for her expertise in the fields of executive compensation and relative performance evaluation.
Professor Albuquerque completed her PhD in Accounting, her MS and MBA degrees at the University of Rochester, and a BA at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa in Portugal. Her research interests lie on the impact of regulation and financial reporting on executive compensation and incentives.
Professor Albuquerque has published in the Journal of Accounting and Economics, the Journal of Financial Economics, The Accounting Review, Management Science, The Review of Accounting Studies, and her work has been featured in the Wall Street Journal.
The seminar will be held in English.
Major information: Eleonora Monaco (e.monaco@unibo.it).