Inalienable Human Capital and Debt Choice: Evidence from Quasi-Exogenous Shocks

Paper presented by Sabri Boubaker, Professor in Finance at EM Normandie.

  • Data: 09 giugno 2022 dalle 13:00 alle 14:00

  • Luogo: Online (Teams) e Live in Aula Seminari 1, via Capo di Lucca 34

Hart and Moore (1994) theoretically analyze how inalienable human capital affects debt contracting. We examine, empirically, how firms address the increased threat of losing inalienable human capital by choosing between private and public debt: Following the staggered rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) that facilitate the outflow of key talents to rivals, treated firms significantly increase the reliance on private debt financing. Evidence from state-level noncompete enforceability shocks further confirms our main findings. Our overall evidence indicates that flexible renegotiation and timely monitoring are important benefits of private debt in reacting to the risk of losing human capital.

Sabri Boubaker is a Professor of Finance. He joined EM Normandie in 2019. He has a PhD from the Université de Paris-Est, awarded in 2006 and an accreditation to supervise research (HDR) from the same university, awarded in 2010. His research interests are the ownership structure and control of listed companies. Sabri Boubaker has published many academic papers (+80 papers) in international journals. He is co-founder and co-chair of the annual Paris Financial Management Conference (2013) and the Vietnam Symposium in Banking and Finance (VSBF) series (2016). He is also the President of the International Society for the Advancement of Financial Economics (ISAFE).

The seminar is held in Englis.

Attend the online event.